

ROUTING AND TRANSMITTAL SLIP

Date

TO: (Name, office symbol, room number, building, Agency/Post)		Initials	Date
1.	<i>Bobbie</i>		
2.			
3.	<i>OS/Registry</i>		
4.			
5.			

Action	File	Note and Return
Approval	For Clearance	Per Conversation
As Requested	For Correction	Prepare Reply
Circulate	For Your Information	See Me
Comment	Investigate	Signature
Coordination	Justify	

REMARKS

*one copy, pls. Return
copy to me and forward Original
to registry on this buck slip for
filing.*

*To 3: Pls file: Committee on Post Office / Civil Service
ALSO: ADD KEY WORD "NEXUS" to list - Nexus is
used to describe the relationship between
adjudicative criteria and National Security concerns.
it will soon be a big issue.*

DO NOT use this form as a RECORD of approvals, concurrences, clearances, and similar actions

FROM: (Name, org. symbol, Agency/Post)	Room No.—Bldg.
	Phone No.

5041-102

* U.S.G.P.O.: 1983-421-529/320

OPTIONAL FORM 41 (Rev. 7-76)
Prescribed by GSA
FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.206

Nexus

OCA 86-0429
11 February 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: C/PB/PPG/OS
C/SECOM

STAT

FROM:

[Redacted]

Legislation Division
Office of Congressional Affairs

SUBJECT: Proposed Response to Representatives Schroeder
and Edwards Letter on Personnel Security
Investigations

1. Attached for your review and comment please find copies of the proposed separate but identical responses to the letter of January 28, 1986 from Representatives Schroeder and Edwards on personnel security investigations.

2. As the Representatives request a response by Friday, February 15, 1986, we would appreciate receiving your comments no later than noon Thursday, February 13, 1986.

3. Your cooperation is most appreciated.

STAT

[Redacted]


Attachment:
as stated

*DD/PSM
handled*

OS REGISTERED

[Redacted]

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515



January 24, 1986

Per/
poly

The Honorable William J. Casey
Director of Central Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Mr. Casey:


In December, the Pentagon ordered the Army's polygraph training school to cease use of a lesson plan and classroom hand-out on personnel screening because of the inappropriate material they contained. Some of the questions suggested for use were:

Have you ever consulted a psychiatrist?
Have you ever thought of committing suicide?
Have you ever experimented with the use of drugs?
Have you ever associated with persons addicted to the use of drugs?

Do you sometimes use alcoholic beverages to excess?
Has any member of your family ever been an alcoholic?
Have you ever been tempted to steal from an employer?
Are you a name dropper?
Do you belong to an ethnic club or group?
Have you ever purchased any anti-American books?
Do you believe you have any homosexual tendencies?
Have you ever been a party to an abortion?
Do you believe in background security investigations?

The lesson plan also says that membership in labor unions, the NAACP, political organizations other than the two major national political parties, or the Jehovah's Witnesses could be proper areas of inquiry during a background investigation. The material also says that any homosexuality should be pursued but that "occasional sexual 'flings' are to be expected."

We are writing to you because your agency conducts personnel security investigations. Many of the personal characteristics on which the DoD polygraph manual focused are also the subject of inquiries by personnel security investigators. In connection with hearings we plan to hold on the issue of personnel security investigations, we would like to know who could testify on behalf of your agency on the relationship between the types of issues listed above and the proclivity to commit espionage.



Hon. William J. Casey

January 24, 1986

Page 2


In order to build a useful hearing record, we would like a witness who can testify on the nexus, demonstrated through a scientifically valid method, between the types of behavior described above and espionage. Moreover, if your agency has determined that any of the subject areas listed above are inappropriate for inquiry, we would like to know the basis on which you made such determination.

We would appreciate hearing from you by February 15, 1986.

Sincerely yours,



DON EDWARDS
Chairman, Subcommittee on Civil
and Constitutional Rights,
Committee on the Judiciary



PAT SCHROEDER
Chairwoman, Subcommittee on
Civil Service, Committee on
Post Office and Civil Service

EXECUTION
ROUTING SLIP

TO:

		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
2	DDCI		X		
3	EXDIR		X		
4	D/ICS		X		
5	DDI				
6	DDA				
7	DDO		X		
8	DDS&T		X		
9	Chm/NIC				
10	GC				
11	IG		X		
12	Compt		X		
13	D/OLL	X			
14	D/PAO				
15	D/PERS				
16	VC/NIC		X		
17	D/Security		X		
18	C/Secom		X		
19					
20					
21					
22					

SUSPENSE 15 Feb 86

Date

Remarks

TO #13: Please prepare an appropriate response.

Executive Secretary


27 JAN 86

Date

3637 (10-81)

STAT

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515



January 24, 1986

Per / Poly

The Honorable William J. Casey
Director of Central Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

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
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Have you ever been tempted to steal from an employer?
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Hon. William J. Casey
January 24, 1986
Page 2


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Sincerely yours,



DON EDWARDS
Chairman, Subcommittee on Civil
and Constitutional Rights,
Committee on the Judiciary



PAT SCHROEDER
Chairwoman, Subcommittee on
Civil Service, Committee on
Post Office and Civil Service

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT**ROUTING SLIP**

TO:

		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
2	DDCI		X		
3	EXDIR		X		
4	D/ICS				
5	DDI				
6	DDA		X		
7	DDO		X		
8	DDS&T				
9	Chm/NIC				
10	GC		X		
11	IG		X		
12	Compt				
13	D/OLL	X			
14	D/PAO				
15	D/PERS		X		
16	VC/NIC				
17	D/Security		X		
18	C/Secom		X		
19					
20					
21					
22					
SUSPENSE		15 Feb 86			
		Date			

Remarks

TO #13: Please prepare an appropriate response.

Executive Secretary

27 JAN 86

Date

3637 (10-81)

STAT

The Honorable Don Edwards
Chairman
Subcommittee on Civil
and Constitutional Rights
Committee on the Judiciary
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I am replying to your letter of January 28, 1986 to the Director of Central Intelligence concerning personnel security investigations.

The Central Intelligence Agency was not involved in the "lesson plan" or "classroom hand-out" materials which your letter indicates were used by a Department of the Army polygraph training school before their use was ordered discontinued. The Agency recognizes that personnel security investigations can, by nature, appear to be intrusive. Nonetheless, the Agency works to insure that all such investigations under its jurisdiction are properly conducted and inquire only into those areas which involve legitimate security concerns.

Personnel security investigations are, of course, only one part of the Agency's personnel security program. The purpose of this program is to insure that all persons hired and retained by the Agency possess the extremely high degree of trustworthiness required to deal with this nation's most sensitive national security information. Determinations of trustworthiness are, however, not made in a vacuum. They hinge, instead, on the particulars of each case. Further, the sorts of information which may be required to reach a determination of trustworthiness in a particular case and the means by which that information is assembled can involve some of the most sensitive intelligence sources and methods information which the Agency possesses.

Your letter requests that the Agency furnish a witness to testify, among other things, on the relationship "demonstrated through a scientifically valid method" between the sorts of issues raised by the Army materials and a "proclivity to commit

espionage". Because of the Agency's view that determinations of trustworthiness cannot be made in a vacuum, the Agency does not believe that a general discussion on the subject would be particularly useful, especially a discussion which had as its reference criteria not generated by the Agency and apparently discontinued by the Army. Further, were the discussion to turn to specific sources and methods used by the Agency, I fear that it would fall within an area, intelligence oversight, which has been committed to the jurisdiction of the intelligence committees. It is for these reasons the Agency is reluctant to provide a witness as described in your letter.

Let me, however, suggest the following. If, at the time the Subcommittees' proceedings in this matter have been completed you still believe the record needs supplementation, the Agency would be willing to discuss with your staff the possibility of providing, in an appropriate format, written supplementary materials.

I hope that this is responsive to your letter. A copy of this letter is also being forwarded to Chairwoman Schroeder.

Sincerely,

David D. Gries
Director, Office of Congressional Affairs

=====

Message Delivery

Log File For: [REDACTED]

STAT

Delivery Date/Time: 3/13/86 at 09:59 A.M.

=====

Subject: NEXUS

Comments:

FYI - "NEXUS" is now key word in OS/Registry system. Pls annotate docs going to registry when they have relevance to NEXUS. I am keeping file on NEXUS and would appreciate copies of relevant docs. NEXUS is likely to be hot item soon on national policy scene.(correction - it already is)

Reply by: / /

Security: 3

Priority:

[REDACTED]

VOL3

yes

VOL3

yes

STAT

VOL3

yes

VOL3

yes